STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA
THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1953
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:30 a. m., in room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, presiding.
Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin, and Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota.
Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel: Donald Surine, assistant counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Herbert Hawkins, investigator; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
…
THE CHAIRMAN. … Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Barmine?
In this matter now before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. BARMINE. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Barmine, what is your present occupation?
TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER BARMINE, CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN BRANCH OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA
Mr. BARMINE. I am Chief of the Russian Branch of the Voice of America.
The CHAIRMAN. And where were you born?
Mr. BARMINE. I was born 53 years ago, in Russia.
The CHAIRMAN. What position did you hold, if any, under the Russian Government?
Mr. BARMINE. I volunteered in the Red army when I was 19. I remained in the military service, active and inactive, until 1935. The service was interrupted by diplomatic assignment. I retired finally in 1935 with the rank of brigadier general, and I was appointed to Greece, as Charge d’Affaires of the Russian Government in Greece.
The CHAIRMAN. May I ask: Do these cameras down here disturb you?
Mr. BARMINE. No.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish the photographers would not use flash bulbs.
Mr. BARMINE. I resigned in 1937. I broke with the Russian Government, and I went into exile in Paris.
In January 1940 I arrived in the United States. I worked here in a factory, and then in the National Broadcasting Co. until 1942, when I entered military service in the United States Army in antiaircraft artillery. I received my citizenship in 1943. I worked in the Office of Strategic Services until 1944, and then with the Reader’s Digest as an editorial consultant until 1946.
In 1948 I was invited to join the Voice of America, and I have since been there.
The CHAIRMAN. You were a general in the Russian Army, were you?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right.
Senator MUNDT. Who invited you, General, into the Voice of America in 1948?
Mr. BARMINE. William Lindsey White, the son of William Allen White, recommended me, without my knowledge, to Charles Thayer, Acting Chief of the Voice. Charles Thayer invited me for an interview and then offered me employment.
The CHAIRMAN. You are under sentence of death at the present time; is that right?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right, by a Moscow military tribunal. The Chairman. How do you feel? Fairly alive?
Mr. BARMINE. I feel fine, thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. What was your position in Russian Military Intelligence when you were in Russia?
Mr. BARMINE. I was one of the special assistants to the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Berzin.
The CHAIRMAN. To the Chief of Military Intelligence?
Mr. BARMINE. One of several.
The CHAIRMAN. And the Chief of Russian Military Intelligence was General Berzin, B-e-r-z-i-n?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us the occasion of your breaking with communism and your being sentenced to death by the present Russian regime?
Mr. BARMINE. I had my doubts and misgivings about the policy of the Soviet Government for many years before, but I didn’t see any other possibility to serve my country. But by 1937, when most o my classmates at General Staff School, generals of the Red army and the General Staff, were shot and liquidated during the purges, I realized that this is the time when anybody who wants to serve the Russian people should break and fight against the Soviet Government and against communism. That is what I did. I went to Paris, and I remained there.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly speak a little louder, sir?
Mr. BARMINE. I wrote an appeal asking my colleagues in the diplomatic corps in Europe to join me in this fight and abandon the service of the Soviet Government. And then, while working in France, I wrote a book on the same subject, which was published. I was working on this book nights. Then, after the book was published, I went to see, in the New York Times office, Mr. Phillip, and he showed me the agency wire, the press wire, from Moscow, that Alexander Bar mine “will be tried and condemned by the Moscow military court next Friday.”
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the press report was that you would be tried and condemned and sentenced to death?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right. And I was condemned.
The CHAIRMAN. So the decision was made ahead of time that afterward you would be tried and condemned?
Mr. BARMINE. In my free time I was writing on the same subject. I wrote a series of articles for the New York Times for Belgian, Swedish, and French papers.
The CHAIRMAN. May I say, General, that when I first learned that a general from the Russian military intelligence was with our information program, I was very much interested. We spent considerable time checking upon your background, what you have done since you have been in the United States, and satisfied ourselves that you have cooperated fully with the FBI, cooperated fully with the real anti-Communist elements in the Voice of America, and have been doing a good job over there. Originally, we could not quite understand how a former general in Russian military intelligence was there.
As assistant head of Russian military intelligence, having been born and having lived in Russia, I assume that you feel rather well qualified to pass upon the type of broadcasts that will appeal to the Russian mind. Right?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. sir. I was also writing when I was in Russia. Then, since 1937, I have been doing a lot of writing. For many years I was writing in American papers, in Canadian papers. I published articles in Harper’s and in the Reader’s Digest. In 1944 I had an article about infiltration of Communists in the United States Government. I wrote for Saturday Evening Post, and I worked in the National Broadcasting Co., and then in the Office of Strategic Services, also in radio, so I consider myself qualified for the job I am doing.
The CHAIRMAN. Your title as of today is what, in the Voice?
Mr. BARMINE. Chief of the Russian Branch of the Voice.
The CHAIRMAN. Chief of the Russian Branch of the Voice?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. And you have no vested interest, certainly, in any other desk in the Voice, other than to see them do a good job. Is that correct?
Mr. BARMINE. As much as I am interested in effectiveness of the Voice.
The CHAIRMAN. The reason I ask you that: We had a witness, Dr. Glazer, here yesterday; Dr. Glazer discussed the lack of wisdom of discontinuing Hebrew broadcasts when the Russians became publicly anti-Semitic. One of the other witnesses intimated that we should discredit Dr. Glazer’s testimony to some extent, because he had a vested interest in his own desk. Now, you have no such vested interest in the Hebrew desk or any other desk?
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. But I would request to qualify my position.
I am interested in the work of the Voice of America as a whole, because I consider that the Voice of America is the most effective weapon of psychological warfare and propaganda among all the media that are in the possession of the State Department. I consider that this organization is the best that the State Department has. Before, I was very disturbed by the turn that coverage of the hearings took in the American press. I think in their headlines and in some of the reports the American press was rather unfair to the Voice. Because the Voice of America is doing a very effective job.
Next to my Army outfit, in which I served, I consider the men with whom I have worked, the overwhelming majority of the Voice of America, the most selfless, devoted, hardworking people fighting communism.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you feel that there has been some confusion in the minds of the people at this time as to just when we are discussing the Voice and when we are discussing the International Information program. Is that right?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. I must emphasize that we are a separate entity working in New York, the Voice. in 46 languages. We are under the direction of the International Information Administration in Washington. But the head of the Voice, responsible for the Voice, is in New York.
I have seen in the papers and I have seen also statements here about heads of the Voice, assistant heads of the Voice—who are not. They are executives of the International Information Administration. If you would believe the papers, we have more heads of the Voice now than we ever had in the past 6 years. And, of course, there is the difference between the activity of the International Information Administration and ours.
I think that we have 46 languages, and in the overwhelming majority of these languages we are doing an excellent job. We could be also shocked by facts of waste or poor performance of one or another desk, but our output, our effectiveness, should be judged by the finished product, by our broadcasts.
I can say for my branch: We are putting on the air 5 programs a day around the clock. We broadcast about half a million words a month. I can stand with any feature, any word, that our unit puts out, as effective anti-Communist, completely pro-American material. And I can stand any inspection of these scripts by this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I may say that I agree with you that there are a sizable number of the desks over there that are doing an outstanding job. I think your desk is one of them.
Mr. BARMINE. Now, it was stated here that there is a fantastic situation in the Voice as related to the activity of Mr. Harris or Mr. Johnstone or others. I may say we are rather the object of their activity, but not a part of it in the sense that we could be responsible for these fantastic things which were brought out there.
The CHAIRMAN. When you refer to Mr. Johnstone, I would like to have it clear that you are referring to Mr. William C. Johnstone, and not the Dr. Johnson who has taken over.
Mr. BARMINE. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.
Mr. BARMINE. So when the question of the effectiveness of the Voice is being judged, we must have in mind that the effectiveness and quality of our work should be judged by our output.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are trying to make clear at this time that Reed Harris, William Johnstone, Stoner, Hewitt, those men, are not part of the Voice?
Mr. BARMINE. No, they are above the Voice.
The CHAIRMAN. They are in the International Information Administration.
Mr. BARMINE. They are people who are writing guidances for us. But we are doing our work in New York.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, there has been some complaint by some of the men in the International Information Administration that the New York office of the Voice has failed to—I believe the word they used was “cooperate.” Has the New York branch of the Voice had any difficulty with the heads of the International Information Administration? And if so, describe it.
Mr. BARMINE. I would say that we have constant difficulties, because of differences of view about carrying effective anti-Communist propaganda. When we received directives and guidances during the last several years, very often we were forced to protest violently and disagree and ask to change this directive, because we considered that in many cases these directives impaired the possibility of carrying effective anti-Communist propaganda.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you violently disagreed, you say, with some of the directives, because you thought the directives received from Washington, from the International Information Administration, would impair your ability to put on a real anti-Communist program, counterpropaganda?
Mr. BARMINE. Many of our chiefs of political desks broadcasting specifically to the Iron Curtain countries. and our superior officers, Mr. Puhan, director of all our programs, and Mr. D’Alessandro, many times violently objected to them, because we considered that we could never carry out our work effectively if we would follow them.
Senator MUNDT. Were your disagreements with Mr. Puhan, or with Washington?
Mr. BARMINE. No; Mr. Puhan and Mr. D’Alessandro and many chiefs of desks had often expressed disagreement in our meetings about the directives from Washington.
Senator MUNDT. You would express your disagreements to Mr. Puhan, and he would relay those disagreements to Washington?
Mr. BARMINE. No; we all participated. These meetings were in the presence of all. When we received these directives, we would discuss them, and in these discussions our superiors in the Voice would join us and support us.
Senator MUNDT. You would express your disagreements and send them to Washington, and would Washington overrule your view?
Mr. BARMINE. You see, sometimes the resistance and opposition would back down and soften them a little and change them, but then they might come back again. I might say that in these meetings we often said, “These directives are usually negative directives, ‘Don’t do this,’ ‘Don’t do that,’ ‘Be careful about that’.” We practically never received a directive to do something positive.
Senator MUNDT. That was my next question: whether you ever received a directive from Washington spelling out some specific anti-Communist program urging you to project it.
Mr. BARMINE. Very often where there was a question of timing, a necessity of quick response, instead of encouraging us and telling us to proceed quickly on this or that, we were told “Be careful. Wait until developments. Avoid this. Don’t emphasize this. Play down this. Wait until new developments”—and so on.
Senator MUNDT. The Washington directives, then, emphasized caution?
Mr. BARMINE. Much too much.
Senator MUNDT. Much too much caution?
Mr. BARMINE. Caution and sometimes inactivity.
Senator MUNDT. Did you receive the rather famous Washington directive to use the Howard Fast book?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes; we did.
Senator MUNDT. As an old Communist specialist, what do you think about that?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, I could speak for my Branch, as a matter of fact. We received the Howard Fast directive, but in this case, due to these disagreements that happen usually on these kinds of directives, we, I would say, applied broad interpretation.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, instead of refusing to follow it, you gave it what you would consider a broad interpretation?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, our broad interpretation was the following. For our Russian Branch, I approved two scripts about Howard Fast, and we put them on the air. But those scripts were not quoting Fast as an authority to support our position, but blasting Fast as a traitor and a contemptible liar.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any of those scripts with you?
Mr. BARMINE. I may quote one last concluding sentence from one of those scripts, which was broadcast in the Russian news.
Here is the conclusion of our broadcast on Howard Fast:
So long as Fast refrains from committing crimes that are punishable under the law, American authorities visit no punishment on him—no matter how monstrous his lies about America may be—for the very reason that America is a free country. For that matter, what would be the point of punishing Fast? As I stated before, the average American is already punishing him, as he is punishing every slanderer and liar, by having only one feeling for him—contempt.
Senator MUNDT. That is a very good way to interpret the Howard Fast directive.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you have the feeling that the Washington office was trying to impair your effort to put on a real hard-hitting program of anti-Communist counterpropaganda?
Mr. BARMINE. Well. it was rather periodic, from time to time.
The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.
Mr. BARMINE. It was a chronic disease. It was coming at intervals all the time for several years.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Harris testified yesterday, and he is in the room. In case I misquote him, he will have a chance to correct me. He testified in effect that while the Hebrew-language desk had been attempted to be canceled, they did order that the anti-Semitism of the Soviets be played up on the other language desks. Is that true, or false?
Mr. BARMINE. I regret to say that that is simply not true.
The CHAIRMAN. It is untrue?
Mr. BARMINE. It is contradictory to the truth.
Senator MUNDT. Can you detail that a little bit?
Why is it not true?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, Senator, I have no authority to quote the way Mr. Harris did from the official guidances, which are confidential. If I would be able to, I would be able to prove that this statement of Mr. Harris is directly opposite to the truth. In fact, the first guidance was ordering us to play down not only the anti-Semitic, but even the anti-Zionist angle.
The CHAIRMAN. In the Russian language?
Mr. BARMINE. In all languages, including Russian. When I stated my very violent objection, using even the terms that “this is sabotaging the most effective issue that we have”—Mr. Puhan supported me in this meeting, and several other chiefs of desks—this “guidance” was softened a little bit. But I can’t go into details. I can only say that the intention of those guidances was in direct opposition to what Mr. Harris states here.
Senator MUNDT. Can you say this, without violating any confidential information? After you made your protest and the guidance was softened, was it softened to the extent of encouraging you to make wide use of this issue?
Mr. BARMINE. Not at all. It was more “weasel-worded,” I would say.
Senator MUNDT. More “weasel-worded”?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, with the result that we still would be unable to carry any effective campaign. And so we stated. This argument was going on for the last month, almost in every meeting where we discussed this thing.
Senator MUNDT. Did the time ever come when your point of view prevailed?
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir; not yet.
Senator MUNDT. In other words, the argument went on for practically a month?
Mr. BARMINE. Since January 14, when the trials of doctors were announced in Moscow.
Senator MUNDT. And your feeling that we should emphasize the anti-Semitic qualities of communism never did prevail in the argument?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, I would say we finally won the decision on the matter so that we could discuss this angle as a secondary issue; although in my opinion this was the most effective weapon given into our hands. We have to remember that a lot of people in Europe and in all areas consider still the Communist movement, even if they disagree with it, as a liberal movement on the left. Here we have an excellent possibility to point out that there is no difference between Hitlerism and Stalinism, that this is only Red fascism. We can prevail on many hesitating neutrals by exploiting this issue to the maximum. So I think it would be very harmful to us to play this issue down.
Senator MUNDT. You were never encouraged, then, to point out the very obvious fact that Hitlerism and Stalinism, nazism and communism, both being anti-Semitic, both being totalitarian, are similar, and equally repugnant.
Mr. BARMINE. Well, I wouldn’t state exactly that. Senator, because, as I say, this was a long argument, and we were sometimes gaining a little in position, sometimes losing. We were never told directly not to. Because, after all, I would say even Mr. Connors, with his assumed innocence of the Communist problem, wouldn’t say, “Don’t speak, because it might hurt them.”
Senator MUNDT. Were you ever told in positive terms: “Here is a fine issue. Give it the old college try. Go to work on it”?
Mr. BARMINE. As I say, I couldn’t quote exactly. We were told this was a secondary issue, which should be played down.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Barmine, do you have any idea as to how many private radios there are in the U. S. S. R.?
Mr. BARMINE. Recently it was published that only in the Moscow area, according to the Soviet estimate, there are 240,000 shortwave receivers—only in the Moscow area. And there are several million throughout the U. S. S. R.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the situation in Russia today? May anyone buy a shortwave radio set?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Anyone may?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know if they are available in the Russian market?
Mr. BARMINE. They are available, at several hundred rubles, so even a worker with middle income can afford it.
Senator MUNDT. Have you any evidence to indicate that the radios that they buy in Moscow have been plugged so that they cannot receive American broadcasts?
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. They can. We have definite and positive evidence that they can. I have with me statements and letters proving this fact, that we are widely listened to in Russia.
Senator MUNDT. When there is a shortwave set in Russia, the Russian, then, can hear our broadcast, as far as the technical aspect of it is concerned?
Mr. BARMINE. The Russian in Kazan, in the Volga area, in the Caucausus, in Moscow, in Leningrad, can go to the shop, buy a short- wave set, plug it in, and listen; but if he is caught he might be shot. In Kazan, the military court condemned to death several hundred people for listening to the Voice.
Senator MUNDT. That is right. But I had a radioman call up my office and try to convince me—and I know nothing about electronics from the standpoint of the technical aspects—that these radio sets that are procurable in Russia are plugged so as to keep out American broadcasts. Now, your testimony is that you have positive information that that is not being done, or could not be done.
Mr. BARMINE. May I be allowed to quote from evidence that I have, sir?
Senator MUNDT. Yes. I want to hear something good about the Voice. If you have something good about it, you may quote it.
Mr. BARMINE. Yes: I think it is time to hear something good about the Voice.
Senator MUNDT. I agree.
Mr. BARMINE. Here is the deposition taken from a Soviet Air Force captain who has defected and has now come over to our side.
[Reading:]Any person in the U. S. S. R. may own a radio receiver. Most officers own a radio receiver. An estimated 15 to 20 percent of the U. S. S. R. population own radio receivers, and nearly all of these people at some time or another listen to the Voice of America.
The listening to broadcasts of the Voice of America by Soviet communications personnel constitutes a definite security problem in the Soviet Army. Apparently the practice is almost universal, and it continues despite strenuous efforts to stop it. Soviet field and tank radio sets can tune frequencies used by VOA, and operators often turn their sets to listen to these programs. Reception is generally fairly good, and the content of these broadcasts is widely disseminated.
This is a statement by a captain of the Soviet Air Force.
Then we have another statement by a captain of a Soviet Tank Force who defected. During his testimony he was asked:
Do Soviet soldiers listen to radio broadcasts frequently? Do they listen to the Voice of America?
His answer was:
Soviet officers are able to listen to the radio every day in their recreation centers. Officers have access to more private radios and are able to listen to the Voice of America.
Then the next question:
Are the Voice of America broadcasts effective?
The answer:
They have been instrumental in causing the defection of Soviet officers in East Berlin.
Then the next one was an excerpt from a statement by a sergeant of the Soviet Army who defected and is now enlisted in the American Army—is now at Fort Dix. The sergeant listened frequently to the Voice of America Russian-language program in Austria. The source is convinced that many people listen to the Voice of America in the Soviet Union, even though reception is difficult because of jamming. The sergeant’s uncle, who resides in Odessa, is a regular listener to the Voice of America.
May I point out here that the Soviet Union spends 150 million rubles on jamming only Russian broadcasts. That means more than all the Information program of the State Department costs the United States Government. They would certainly not spend so much money if we were not effective. We are attacked all the time in the Soviet press. Throughout the Soviet Union we are slandered by the radio. Since there is a monopoly press in the Soviet Union, they certainly wouldn’t give us free publicity like that if we didn’t hit them and didn’t hurt them.
Senator MUNDT. So, if we say the right thing on the radio, we are getting through, then. Your testimony is that it is an effective anti-Communist device?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. Here is testimony from a German prisoner of war, who testified that while he was in Kazan, a Soviet major and a Russian woman both listened to the Voice of America. The major had his own radio, a new Russian model with three wavelengths. This radio was quite good. It was named Ural, and cost about 600 rubles. They were greatly impressed when they heard figures, especially com parisons between the iving standards of the American worker and the Russian worker and t e prices of items in the States compared to those of the U. S. S. R. The German prisoner mentioned that such broadcasts had the greatest effect upon those people.
Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you another question. You will not
have to read any more evidence on that. But, since you have described the hazards which must be undertaken by a listener behind the Iron Curtain, I am curious to know what your interpretation is of what is the proper kind of program to project to people who have to actually risk their lives to listen. Do you think it should be music? Should it be a description of a book about the family life of Texas? Should it be straight news? Should it be answering the slanders of the Russians? Should it stir up dissidence behind the Iron Curtain? What is your considered judgment as to the type of program we should project to these people who listen at such great peril to themselves?
Mr. BARMINE. Senator, my judgment is my practice. That is what I am doing in Russian broadcasts, and I have been working on those broadcasts for 4 years.
Senator MUNDT. What are you doing? We do not hear the broadcasts. I would like to know what you are doing.
Mr. BARMINE. What we are doing? Yes. First of all, we don’t use music at all—no jazz music; no music at all—because we consider it is a waste of time to spend it on music when it is dangerous to listen. Our program content is half time news and halftime political commentaries. These political commentaries and features, dramatic presentations, are always sharply anti-Communist or are positively pro-American, describing the American way of life and freedom. We have also, by the way, regular religious programs, which we established about 2 years ago. Twice a month, Bishop John of San Francisco is broadcasting himself the religious sermons to Russia.
Senator MUNDT. You are broadcasting a religious program to Russia?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. Twice a month we broadcast regularly. Then on Christmas and Eastertime we have special religious broadcasts four times a day. And I might add that, because we have new style and old Russian style [calendars], we are rather ahead of the American stations, because we present Christmas programs twice, on December 25 and January 7; and Easter programs also twice.
Senator MUNDT. Have you had any disagreement with the head of your religious desk in New York about the desirability or the content of these religious programs?
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. I instituted this program before Mr. Lyons came on the job. But we work in perfect cooperation, and I have no difficulties or disagreement whatsoever.
Senator MUNDT. He has not tried to interfere with you?
Mr. BARMINE. No. sir.
Senator MUNDT. Has the Washington office tried to interfere with you?
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. I am just not sure that they are well informed about the content of our religious broadcasts.
If I may be allowed, I will only quote two lines about those religious broadcasts, which I have as an answer from listeners. I have them here. I won’t read from these. These are our religious broadcasts for the last year.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not intend to read all of them?
Mr. BARMINE. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. BARMINE. But here is one letter addressed to Bishop John.
[Reading:]DEAR FATHER: While listening to the radio, I accidentally picked up the wave speaking from America. A radio was presented to me by a family which left for Australia. That radio set is the sole enjoyment of ours, as we can listen to the Russian Voice of America now. I heard you. Father, only twice. When we heard you for the first time, we couldn’t restrain our tears, but they were tears of joy. Now we listen to the Voice of America regularly, and we have the feeling that we are not alone.
Then another letter, from Trieste, to Bishop John:
We heard your word, which was broadcast by the Voice of America on the first day of the holidays, and many people gathered around my hut in the camp. Some were even crying. Your sermon gave all those listening to it strength and hope for the future.
And we have this kind of letter from Australia, from Canada, even from Tahiti.
Senator MUNDT. There is quite a religious feeling still in the heart of the average Russian?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.
Senator MUNDT. When I was in Moscow in 1945, I was told that the Communists had run a census and that 75 percent of the people of Russia at the time, which was about the time of the Hitler invasion, in answer to the census stated that they were still believers.
Mr. BARMINE. That is true, Senator.
Senator MUNDT. You believe that?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right. That is why we carry intensive religious programs.
Senator MUNDT. It would seem to me it would be a very skillful type of broadcast you could give.
When people cannot worship in their own country, and they desire religious programs, you can provide them that service. I am glad to hear that Mr. Lyons has not interfered with you.
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. He was cooperating.
The CHAIRMAN. Has there been a recent plan advanced by the International Information Office to decentralize the Voice?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir. There has.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you describe that plan and tell whether it has been put into effect, or whether it is going to be put into effect, and what you think the result of it would be?
Mr. BARMINE. This was the plan which was profoundly disturbing to many executives of the Voice. I heard here Mr. Dooher quoting yesterday from Dr. Compton’s statement. Now, of course, Dr. Compton’s statement about a plan of reorganization of the Voice— would practically tear the Voice apart and bring the liquidation of the most effective, as I said, anti-Communist weapon that the State Department has.
I first learned about it when Mr. William Johnstone came to the Voice of America, and in the meeting of our broadcasting divisions told us about the plan and about the result of his trip with Dr. Compton around Europe. That was the first time in my life I had seen Dr. Johnstone, because I had never seen him or Mr. Harris before. I never was called to Washington.
The CHAIRMAN. Would this plan have affected your desk in any way?
Mr. BARMINE. As it was presented at this time, the plan was not affecting my desk.
The CHAIRMAN. It would not affect your desk?
Mr. BARMINE. No. sir. In this plan. Dr. Johnstone. William Johnstone. explained to us the following. Now, the Congress approves the funds for the information program—–
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you some questions, and we will see if we cannot make this a bit simpler.
What effect would it have upon, say, the German language desk, this reorganization suggested by Dr. William Johnstone?
Mr. BARMINE. Dr. Johnstone said instead of one plan for a broadcast appropriation approved by Congress, we will have 88 plans at the disposal of every embassy, in particular of every public affairs officer in every embassy. Then he explained to us that that means that the public affairs officer in Paris, Berlin, or New Delhi, decides if he wants that this money would be spent on broadcasts from New York in this language, or on his own project in his country. I would say he was running the risk that the public affairs officer in every country would be more interested in his own baby, the way Mr. Glazer was accused, than in carrying programs from New York.
The CHAIRMAN. Who, for example, would be controlling the German broadcast?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, the decision we should broadcast in German from New York, from the Voice of America, or be replaced by some kind of program in Germany itself, that decision would be in the hands of Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter, I assume, as the public affairs officers.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it would be in the hands of the two men, who, according to the testimony before the committee, were rejected on security grounds?
Mr. BARMINE. Now, I saw Mr. William Johnstone for the first time at this time, and I asked him only one question. I was shocked by this plan, and I asked him: Now, must we understand that he said that the radio programs are not so much effective, often, as meeting the people, or showing them some movies? So I said, “Do you really believe that when we have our programs broadcast on the national networks and are listened to by millions of people, some of your cocktail parties around the embassy and the showing of movies could replace it as a more effective weapon?” I don’t think he had an answer on this.
The CHAIRMAN. You said if Johnstone’s plan were put into effect, Schechter and Kaghan apparently would be in charge of the German broadcast. Now, I have in my hand a document which I think should be put into the record at this time. I have a letter, dated March 4, 1953, addressed to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. This states that:
In compliance with your telephone call this morning to the office of the police commissioner, the following information desired by you has been photostated and airmailed special delivery herein. Ted Kaghan signed a nominating petition for one, Israel Amter, councilman, in 1939.
It goes on to say that the roommate of Kaghan also signed a nominating petition for Israel Amter. It is signed “Yours very truly, George P. Monaghan, Police Commissioner.”
That will be made part of the record.
(The letter referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 39” and will be found in the appendix on p. 567.)
The CHAIRMAN. Then we have the nominating petition for the Communist Party candidate, signed by Ted Kaghan, giving the address 310 West 47th Street, which is the address of Mr. Kaghan. Is that correct? This has been verified as his correct address by the State Department.
(The nominating petition was marked “Exhibit No. 40” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
The CHAIRMAN. So that if Johnstone’s plan was carried out, this man, Kaghan, who, incidentally was defended very vigorously by Mr. Harris the other day—I call this to Mr. Harris’ attention, so that he may comment on it when he takes the stand.
I have in my hand a play written by Mr. Kaghan. I shall read from page 34. The entire play will be marked and made an exhibit, just to give us an idea of the type of individual we have over in HICOG in charge of this program now.
(The play referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 41” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
The CHAIRMAN. To quote from the play:
The Communist Party wants to unite all workers in a struggle for their rights against a decadent system of capitalism.
Gordon was a worker, and because he was a worker, he was shot, like many other workers will be shot if they don’t organize and set up a united front against their enemies, the capitalist class, which is rapidly becoming a Fascist regime.
Would you think that that would lie the type of individual we should have in charge of that program?
Mr. BARMINE. On the basis of this evidence, I wouldn’t think so, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I may say that counsel informs me that his play has received favorable reviews from the Daily Worker.
Mr. BARMINE, we want to give Mr. Harris full time to appear and answer some of this testimony, so we may have to speed this up a bit.
Counsel, have you some further questions?
Mr. COHN. Just 1 or 2, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barmine, we had some testimony down here by a man named Auberjonois, who was the chief of the French service of the Voice of America and is now 1 of the 3 people determining policy up there in the Voice of America, Mr. Auberjonois testified before us about a trip he made to France to talk to some of the French people, and then he told us that he returned to the United States and attended a policy meeting at the Voice of America, in the course of which he expressed his views concerning what type of a product should be sent over the Voice of America to France; and that after he expressed those views you got up and took violent issue with them. I wonder if you could give us your version of just what happened on that occasion. I think that would be of interest, in comparing the extremely effective type of work done by your service and that of many of the other witnesses we have had before us, with the type of work done bv the French Service, and their point of view as to what should be projected.
Mr. BARMINE. I must say we were in disagreement on this issue with Mr. Auberjonois, on practice and principle, along the following lines. He thought that we should put more entertainment in the program, in view of the general feeling in France and the strength of neutralism. I lived in France for 8 years, and I contested his opinion about that brand of neutralism in France, and I said we should be more active in trying to put on programs that were more politically sharp, more with political anti-Communist content, over the air.
Mr. COHN. How much of the French programs did he want to devote to entertainment?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, the proportion was not discussed, but the general tendency. Now, I have, in all fairness to Mr. Auberjonois, to say that he had a good argument which he presented, that since we have to be accepted by the French national network, we have to abide by their desire in a way, because they wanted entertainment. Well, we heard that at this time that was the approach of the French network. They were rather skeptical about a big amount of political broadcasting.
I think he had an argument there. The question was that maybe we should put more effort and make our political broadcasts interesting enough that they could match any entertainment program. That was the subject of our discussion and disagreement.
Mr. COHN. How did you feel on the subject of paying for putting entertainment over there? In other words, did you feel that would accomplish anything?
Mr. BARMINE. No, I don’t think so. I didn’t.
Mr. COHN. And did you get up and press those objections at the meeting?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. We argued rather sharply.
Mr. COHN. And you got up and said, as I think you have testified before, that just putting over entertainment would be a waste of money and would not accomplish any objectives of the Voice. And what did Mr. Auberjonois say to you?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, I think in the heat of argument there were some exchanges that I don’t think are very material to this issue.
Mr. COHN. You would rather not go into that ?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you just one further question. Have you had a constant attempt by the New York branch of the international information program, or I should say the head of the international information program, a constant attempt on their part to plant men on you like Schechter and Kaghan and Lewis and Stone?
Mr. BARMINE. I wouldn’t be able to bring you any evidence or proof, because personnel was not my part of the activity in the Voice. But as much as I knew about candidates who were being proposed to the Voice, I would say that we had often to resist the appointment of people recommendations for whom were made from the field or from Washington, because we considered them not suitable.
The CHAIRMAN. Not suitable on what grounds?
Mr. BARMINE. On political grounds.
The CHAIRMAN. By “political grounds,” you mean they were not anti-Communist?
Mr. BARMINE. There were cases where definitely they would be not suitable, and we were successful in standing our ground and not accepting people of this kind.
The CHAIRMAN. You said you objected to them on political grounds?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. By that, what do you mean? You do not mean because they were Democrats or Republicans, do you?
Mr. BARMINE. No, sir, not because they were Democrats or Republicans. We have an equal amount of both in the Voice, and all are anti-Communists. The question was that some of them would be objectionable on security grounds; some of them not necessarily. But you see, we are carrying on cold war. and we have to have people who are able to do this job effectively. This is not only a job for which we get a salary. We have people dedicated to the cause.
Senator MUNDT. How many people do you have working under you in the Russian desk?
Mr. BARMINE. I have 26 permanent employees, and then I have announcers who are on the assignment, and freelance writers.
Senator MUNDT. Are you satisfied with the ability and the political point of view of your associates, now?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir; I am. First of all, they are all except one American citizens, among them many veterans of the American Army. They are devoted people, and they are carrying on a satisfactory and good job. They are all cleared for security.
Mr. COHN. Mr. Barmine, you have told us about these policy decisions from Washington that played down this purge issue. Now, are there any other specific examples you know of in Washington, where instructions were issued which you regarded as unsound, particularly dealing with important issues having to do with your service, which interfered with an effective anti-Communist program?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, there were.
Mr. COHN. Can you tell us about any specific examples?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, one of the cases that I consider pretty important was a case of the treatment of possible death or illness of Premier Stalin.
Mr. COHN. When did this issue arise? Just within the last day or so?
Mr. BARMINE. No, this issue arose during the party congress last year.
Mr. COHN. That was last October?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. Our job, and particularly my duty, is to look for the vulnerable spots, attacking those spots, we could make our propaganda the most effective.
Now, in studying the stenographic report of the congress of the party, I noticed an extremely curious thing. Practically every speech by a Russian leader or by every foreign Communist Party leader was ending with phrases like “Long live Stalin,” “Stalin must live for ever,” and so on. If it would be only once or twice, it would be not significant. But practically every speech ended this way.
The secretary of the Greek Communist Party, for instance, finished his speech by saying, “Every woman of Greece is ready to give 1 year of her life for 1 minute of Stalin’s life, for prolongation of Stalin’s life. Because there are millions of them, Stalin will live forever.” The Albanian delegate said, “Let Stalin live as long as the Albanian mountains.”
There was a certain pattern there, and after analyzing it, I came to the conclusion that this is a rather pathological fear of mentioning the possibility of Stalin’s death. Why? For a very simple reason.
Communist propaganda for almost 30 years has ascribed every success in the Soviet Union personally to Stalin. Anything that goes well—it is because of the personal participation of Stalin. So they put themselves in their own trap. When everything depends on Stalin, that means if Stalin might get sick, or die, everything can go to pieces. They were pathologically afraid to mention the possibility of Stalin’s death or illness.
So we decided this was a vulnerable spot and we should hit this spot.
I wrote a memorandum on this subject. I can’t quote it, because this memorandum is confidential. I wrote a memorandum to my superiors in the Voice, giving those quotations and offering the possibility of treatment, that we should pound on the question of the possible death of Stalin, and dissension and troubles in case of succession.
My superior in the Voice of America, Mr. Kretzmann, supported my memorandum and addressed his own, with my suggestions, to Washington.
Now, we also offered a script, which was called Stalin’s Testament. We had the idea of Stalin dying—these scripts were pre- pared in October and November—of Stalin dying, writing a testament like Lenin did, and what happened after this testament is read by his successor, with the fight going on.
Those things were presented to the International Information Administration, to Mr. Bradley Connors.
Mr. COHN. Mr. Connors is the top policy adviser, who was under Dr. Compton and Mr. Harris in the International Information Administration. Is that right?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right.
Mr. COHN. By the way, are you familiar with Mr. Connors’ testimony before this committee?
Mr. BARMINE. I watched it on television, sir.
Mr. COHN. You heard him say that he had never read any book by Marx, Lenin, Engels, or Stalin, and knew nothing about Communist propaganda or tactics?
Mr. BARMINE. I did.
Mr. COHN. And you say that this was presented to Mr. Connors?
Mr. BARMINE. That is right.
Mr. COHN. Your plan concerning taking advantage of this obvious weakness as demonstrated by the party congress?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes. The Voice officials in New York supported this and tried to put it through the International Information Administration through Mr. Connors’ office.
Mr. COHN. We want to make this clear. Because Mr. Connors has no connection with the Voice of America, as such.
Mr. BARMINE. No; he is not a member of the Voice of America. He is a superior policy officer who gives us guidance or decides on these kinds of issues, such as the question of: Should we carry a campaign on the possibility of Stalin’s death, or not?
Mr. COHN. So, in other words, you formulated this plan after a study of the party congress. It was approved by the policy adviser to the Voice in New York?
Mr. BARMINE. By Mr. Kretzmann.
Mr. COHN. By Mr. Kretzmann. Of course, it goes without saying that yours is an intimate knowledge of the Russian scene.
By the way, did you know Stalin personally?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, I did.
Mr. COHN. And this plan of yours was endorsed by the chief policy adviser of the Voice, this plan for this weapon, to take advantage of the possibility of Stalin’s illness or death, and it was sent to Washington?
Mr. BARMINE. He wrote his own memorandum supporting this and sent it to Mr. Connors.
Mr. COHN. To Mr. Connors in Washington. What happened after that?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, Mr. Connors requested the opinion of his numerous advisers in several divisions of the State Department, in the Office of Intelligence Research, in political desks, about it. Should we or shouldn’t we carry this kind of campaign? And he presented them our project of this script, Stalin’s Testament.
Now, I, unfortunately, cannot quote and describe the content of memos, because they are confidential. What I can say is that the script was rejected. We were told not to use it. And the campaign on the issue of Stalin’s death and succession was not approved. And one of the motives forwarded to us by Mr. Connors with his obvious approval was that “maybe after all the Russians prefer Stalin to his possible successor.”
Mr. COHN. And you were not allowed to use that issue, is that right?
Mr. BARMINE. And I am not allowed still. I asked if I can carry this Stalin testament yesterday, because of the sudden news of the illness of Stalin, and Mr. Kretzmann said that unfortunately we still have not got agreement from Washington, and therefore until he will try and get one we cannot use it.
The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand the directive was that you could not mention the possibility of Stalin’s death, that you could not criticize Stalin personally over the Russian-language desk?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, the question of the possibility of criticizing Stalin personally was rather complicated. We discussed it and argued it many times. Because it depends how you interpret this directive, again. I will agree, myself, that this would not do any good if we will try to sneer and criticize a personal defect, if we would talk about Stalin’s withered arm or his pockmarks or the color of his eyes—–
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would agree that would not be good propaganda?
Mr. BARMINE. No, that wouldn’t be good propaganda. But then I think we can always say that this is the man who is a brutal tyrant and who murdered more people than any other ruler in history.
The CHAIRMAN. Were you banned from doing that sort of thing?
Mr. BARMINE. No, I wasn’t.
The CHAIRMAN. The only thing you were forbidden to do was to discuss the possibility that Stalin might die, that he might not live forever?
Mr. BARMINE. Well, the question of carrying a whole campaign on this issue, that Stalin may die, and that that will mean terrible troubles in the Soviet Union, pounding on this—we were prevented from doing that by this directive. I think it has reduced greatly our effectiveness, because this is really a vulnerable point in Soviet propaganda.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you felt that you could build up the possible contest among Stalin’s successors and let the Russian people know he was not going to live forever?
Mr. BARMINE. We felt we might build apprehension among those who listened to us by telling them Stalin will not live forever and the whole system will fall to pieces.
Senator MUNDT. Several times this morning you have referred to the fact that suggestions made by the Russian desk were received in Washington. You talked about the attitude toward the Hebrew broadcast. You talked about the attitude toward the anti-Semitic quality of communism. You talked about the instructions to play down the fact that a purge which happened in Czechoslovakia may happen in Russia, and you talk now about this matter of Stalin’s death. I want you to listen to this carefully, because I do not want you to mention any names unless you feel you are right.
Washington is a big place. When you say Washington turned this down and Washington turned that down, I know you referred to the State Department, but we would like to know whether, in your opinion, the man who turned that down was Connors or was Acheson or was Compton or was Harris. Who was responsible for turning it down, if you know?
Mr. BARMINE. When I speak of this I mean those in the International Information Administration who were writing those guidances, approving those guidances, sending them down, and making decisions.
Senator MUNDT. How many people were doing that?
Mr. BARMINE. That is difficult for me to say, because I was never invited to sit on any of those conferences in Washington. But I would often ask Mr. Kretzmann, when he would speak of that. Some times Mr. Connors was mentioned. I don’t know well the setup in the International Information Administration, but I assume that this line and this pattern couldn’t go out without the responsibility of the Chief of Policy.
Senator MUNDT. The Chief of Policy at that time was Dr. Compton?
Mr. BARMINE. No, it was Mr. Connors, so far as I know.
Senator MUNDT. And the only name that was ever mentioned to you when you would say “Who are these people who keep turning down our ideas?”—they would mention Mr. Connors?
Mr. BARMINE. We would receive copies of those guidances. Some times they would have names under them. But not always we were told who.
Senator MUNDT. Did any other names appear on these directives which urged you to abandon your ideas, except the name of Bradley Connors?
Mr. BARMINE. I can’t remember offhand, Senator.
Senator MUNDT. The only name you remember was Mr. Connors?
Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I do have further questions to ask of you, General. However, Mr. Harris has previously claimed that he did not have the same forum to answer the questions which concern him so vitally, he being the Acting Director of the Information program. I under stand that this hearing is being televised until 12: 30. It is now 10 minutes of 12. That will give us a chance to discuss some of these matters with Mr. Harris for 40 minutes. I want to ask you some other questions.
Let me ask you one other question before you leave. What would you think about the wisdom of having for the Policy Director for the entire Information program a man, Brad Connors, who says: “I never read a single book about the Communist movement. I know nothing about their tactics. I have never read about their objectives. I could not define the objectives and strategy of the Communist Party”?
Do you think he would be the ideal man to act as your Policy Director to determine what the policy should be in fighting international communism?
Mr. BARMINE. I think it was shocking, Senator, to hear that.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Will you step down?
…
Mr. HARRIS. … May I return to introducing these scripts, which show very clearly that the Voice was going ahead with exposing this anti-Semitic campaign of the Soviet international communistic conspiracy. I have mentioned that of November 28, prepared by the Central Services Branch.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt. We have been just advised by the Voice people from New York that the scripts that you are presenting were produced prior to the directive which was given in January of 1953. Is that correct? In other words, is it correct that you are presenting scripts showing that we were using the anti-Semitic purge as a counterpropaganda weapon, but that those scripts were prepared before the directive in which you said to play that down?
Mr. HARRIS. I do not have the directive here. I don’t know its exact date. But I will give you the dates of these scripts right now. I have them going up into January, so I can produce them—going up into January and even February.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you follow me, Mr. Harris?
Mr. HARRIS. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. If you produce a script making proper use of this counterpropaganda weapon, which was prepared prior to your directive saving to play it down—–
Mr. HARRIS. My directive? No.
The CHAIRMAN. It is meaningless.
Mr. HARRIS. And furthermore, you have been trying to show that because I issued an order confirming an earlier understanding to cut out the Hebrew desk, I at that point started to follow this international Communist line and thereby cut down their propaganda against anti-Semitism. Now, that is in December. If there were that kind of thing, I would assume——
The CHAIRMAN. Will you do this for us in connection with those exhibits? We will receive them now. Will you then find the date of the directive that ordered that this type of broadcast, this propaganda weapon, be played down, and the name of the man who signed it?
Mr. HARRIS. If there is such a directive, sir, I will. I will just say, about these scripts, these dates.
The CHAIRMAN. We gave you the number of the directive yesterday. Mr. Harris. Yes, sir. I will look it up.
November 28, December 23, December 31, January 13, January 14, and January 19, are the dates of these scripts that I am turning in. They are Central scripts which can be used by all desks and normally are used very heavily.
The one on top there, I see, has the title “Red Fascism,” which is a way of pointing out the comparison between what we call Hitlerism and the Soviet kind of thing.
The CHAIRMAN. What desk was that one prepared by?
Mr. HARRIS. That one, I think—I am sorry; it has left my hands at this minute. It is probably the ideological unit specializing in anti-Communist material.
No; I am wrong. It is the Central Services Branch Talks and Features Section, Special Commentary No. 1185, prepared by Peter Whitney. That is probably a pseudonym used for broadcast purposes.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you a number of these exhibits? I wonder if you could tell us who prepared each one, if you would do that, and we will identify them by exhibit numbers.
Mr. HARRIS. I would be glad to do that.
The first one, as I have said, is January 13, entitled “Red Fascism,” and signed by the name, of Peter Whitney, which may be a byline used just simply for Voice purposes, a pseudonym.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 42,” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
Mr. HARRIS. Here is one of the things it says:
A sensational announcement from Moscow radio early this morning (January 13) gives the world notice that we are about to witness one of those terrible spasms of madness and cruelty, a Soviet purge. The announcement says that nine doctors have been arrested. ***
and so on. And this goes on:
The doctors are said to have been acting as tools of a “Jewish terrorist” group. Five of them appear to be of Jewish origin themselves. Their plot was supposed to have been linked to the United States through the well-known Jewish humanitarian organization, the joint distribution committee.
And they go on with that same subject. Now, that is the first one.
The second one is done by Mr. Howard Maier, M-a-i-e-r, a very able man. I know him. The title is “Punish the Shepherd, Not the Goats.” It has more to do with the Soviet doctors’ arrest, and it is dated January 14. This is also a Central Services Branch. And here is one of the things it starts right out by saying:
Stalin is Hitler, and Hitler is Stalin. • • •
Now, we had some idea developed one time this morning that we do not compare Hitlerism and the Soviet kind of thing.
The CHAIRMAN. Who do you say prepared that?
Mr. HARRIS. This was prepared by Mr. Howard Maier, M-a-i-e-r, one of the able writers of the Voice of America, one of our ablest.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 43,” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
Mr. HARRIS. Now, another one, also by him, by Howard Maier, dated January 19, is entitled “An Appeal to the Russian People.” This does the same sort of thing.
I haven’t got quotes here that are particularly useful for this purpose at this minute. But this goes on into the theme of anti-Semitism, the exposure of the theme of anti-Semitism, very heavily.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 44,” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
Mr. HARRIS. Then we go on to another one, Special Commentary No. 1125, by Mr. Harry Fleischman, dated November 28, 1952. And that is the one that was headed “Zionism—The New Crime.” And it starts out with this quote:
“Stalin will complete Hitler’s program. He will finally wipe out the Jews of central and eastern Europe.” This was a report smuggled out from behind the Iron Curtain in 1949. But nobody believed it. Just as in 1942, when reports of Nazi terrors in Auschwitz and Warsaw were considered fantastic, the world refused to listen.
But today, the farcical trial of Rudolph Slansky and 13 other top Communists in Prague is making the world listen. Of the 14 former Communist stalwarts, 11 are Jews and the trial has been converted into an anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic chorus.
That was the one of November 28.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 45,” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
Mr. HARRIS. We have one here of December 31——
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, I want to give you all the time I can. I have been refraining from interrupting you. But it means very little to us if you read a good peace of counterpropaganda unless we know whether this was prepared before the directive in which you ordered that it be played down.
Mr. HARRIS. All right, sir. May I just identify these briefly, then? The next one is Stalin Takes a Page from Mein Kampf.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 46,” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Barmine, will you step forward?
I think we should have this thing cleared up.
General Barmine, you are reminded that you are still under oath.
May I ask, were these scripts prepared in accordance with the directive from Washington?
FURTHER TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER BARMINE, CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN BRANCH OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA—TAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT OF MR. HARRIS
Mr. BARMINE. A majority of those scripts were prepared before the directive arrived. A couple of them were written during the first days, exactly at the moment when we violently objected to this directive and were protesting, and Mr. Kretzmann carried our protests to Washington. For 1 day or 2 this directive, we were told, was softened. We did it in the same spirit of broadening the directive, in order to be more effective than this directive intended us to be.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are testifying that the scripts prepared here were prepared before the directive issued by Mr. Harris or in defiance of it?
Mr. BARMINE. Not in defiance, but in broad interpretation, which would permit us to be more effective than it was intended. But after this, again, we received several reminders that we should play it down.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.
Mr. BARMINE. We certainly tried in our conscience to make our broadcasts the most effective, despite the difficulties brought by those directives. And these scripts are to the credit of the Voice, I would say, mostly if not only.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.
Mr. HARRIS. I certainly agree that these scripts are to the credit of the Voice, but if by any chance they represented somewhere a defiance of a directive, that would not be a proper thing to do, because our directives are based on foreign policy as developed each day, and if they did defy it, obviously they would not be proper, under the rules of the Department.
I will just identify these and not quote from them, sir.
This is Ideological Special No. 203, December 31, and I gave the title, “Stalin Takes a Page from Mein Kampf.” And it is by James Rorty.
Now, I think there is one more here, by Mr. Liston Oak, Americans Assail Communist Anti-Semitism, an interview with James B. Carey, done on December 23, 1952, and carrying out this theme very thoroughly.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 47,” and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
Mr. HARRIS. Those are the six scripts that I happen to have brought up here, because you mentioned this subject yesterday. But I can produce a great many more, going on beyond this date, or before this date. I did not pick any after January 20, because I knew you would say then, “Well, of course, after January 20 they would change.” But I would be glad to produce some after January 20 if they are of interest to the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Harris.
Mr. HARRIS. That was the total, I think, of the statement that I wish to make at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt, do you have any questions?
Senator MUNDT. I had one question. It seems to me, Mr. Harris, and I am trying to maintain a completely objective point of view as far as you are concerned, as far as your work is concerned—it seems to me that you would lie more helpful to yourself and more helpful to the committee if you would spend less time berating the committee, ac cording to the Newbold Morris formula, which did not prove very effective. I think it would be more helpful if you had proceeded more along the line you indicated a moment ago when you said, earlier in your remarks, about this book. that you had disavowed this book, in the hearings and elsewhere. You certainly have disavowed it in the hearings. If you can produce some printed statement that you dis avowed that book elsewhere, that is the kind of constructive, positive evidence I would like to see you bring into the hearings, rather than something like a clearance by the Civil Service Commission, which you yourself know means nothing. It certainly is very fair of the chairman to point out that the Civil Service Commission also cleared Alger Hiss, that they cleared Remington and Judy Coplon and a great many other characters who proved to be very foul balls.
That does not prove that you are in that category at all. But it should be clear to you that when you say, “The Civil Service Com mission cleared me,” that, to this committee, is meaningless. Because the Civil Service Commission made a lot of mistakes. I am just, in saying that, trying to point out why this committee is not impressed by the fact that the Civil Service Commission has cleared you. What we want is to have you bring in now, as you say you can elsewhere, disavowments of this book and some of the other statements which you made; I think a little more emphasis on the positive feature, a little less on trying to support people like these two individuals over in Germany, about whom apparently neither you nor the committee know very much, because you have not seen the files and neither have we.
Mr. HARRIS. I am just trying to keep the record straight, sir.
Senator MUNDT. We want to get down to the facts of this case.
Mr. HARRIS. All I gave you was the fact that the people in Germany were cleared. I did not go into the cases. And in the matter of the Civil Service Commission, may I just say this, sir? The reason I mention that is because I remember it quite distinctly. It was the first Government investigation that I had experienced. And because I did get some queries from them, I did everything I cou d to bring out to them everything, I think every single thing, that has ever been mentioned in this hearing, except the things in the IIA, that would have a bearing on my loyalty and security. I gave them a copy of my book. I went up and dug up another book of mine, called Traveler’s Windfall, which has no political content, and gave it to the investigator. I specifically suggested that he go up and look at the Columbia Spectator and go all the way through it. I suggested names for him to see, including names who would feel not inclined to give me too good a bill of health at that time. I have made an honest effort, and I think I could prove it if we could find that particular investigator. He might even remember it. He developed a report almost this thick [indicating]. And I think if there had been anything startling to him at that time or to the Board that reviewed it, there certainly would have been some repercussions.
Senator MUNDT. I am not questioning that the Civil Service Commission made a lot of fine investigations, but because they made so many poor ones, this committee is not impressed. From Carl Manzani, all the way down the line, we have seen too many Civil Service Commission clearances wind up in the Federal penitentiary because they were Communists.
Mr. HARRIS. Please let me assure this committee that you are not going to see this case wind up in any Federal penitentiary, because I am telling the truth.
Senator MUNDT. I am simply pointing out that as far as this committee is concerned, we can no longer rely on a Civil Service Commission investigation that has missed in as many cases as it has over the years. Today, there are a number of people who are wearing Federal penitentiary numbers, and they have them solely because congressional committees investigated the facts. produced the evidence, the grand juries indicted, and the Federal courts convicted.
